Trillions in real estate increasingly exposed to existential climate risk.
More and more experts as worried, for near term, about things like infrastructure and insurance as they are about ice and corals.
Andrew Dessler in The Climate Brink:
I’ve become convinced that insurance is one of the places where climate change will manifest itself most clearly in our everyday lives and I’ve written about it before on TCB (https://www.theclimatebrink.com/p/climate-change-and-insurance-the). Because of that, I wanted to bring to your attention this great post from the Moving Day Substack. It describes the details of how the insurance market, in collusion with State government, is using smoke and mirrors to push climate risk onto the general public — i.e., you and me. Insurance companies are among the most sophisticated evaluators of risk, so when climate risk gets too hot for them to handle, we should be worried.
Harvard Business School Faculty and Research:
This paper studies how homeowners insurance markets respond to growing climate losses and how this impacts mortgage market dynamics. Using Florida as a case study, we show that traditional insurers are exiting high risk areas, and new lower quality insurers are entering and filling the gap. These new insurers service the riskiest areas, are less diversified, hold less capital, and 20 percent of them become insolvent. We trace their growth to a lax insurance regulatory environment.
Yet, despite their low quality, these insurers secure high financial stability ratings, not from traditional rating agencies, but from emerging rating agencies. Importantly, these ratings are high enough to meet the minimum rating requirements set by government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs). We find that these new insurers would not meet GSE eligibility thresholds if subjected to traditional rating agencies’ methodologies. We then examine the implications of these dynamics for mortgage markets.
We show that lenders respond to the decline in insurance quality by selling a large portion of exposed loans to the GSEs. We quantify the counterparty risk by examining the surge in serious delinquencies and foreclosure around the landfall of Hurricane Irma. Our results show that the GSEs bear a large share of insurance counterparty risk, which is driven by their mis-calibrated insurer eligibility requirements and lax insurance regulation.
Insurance makes the mortgage market work. You can’t get a mortgage from a bank (these days, likely a nonbank) without insurance, because the lender needs some kind of guarantee that you’ll pay them back. Your pledge to the bank that it can have your house if you don’t repay the loan has to be accompanied by property insurance that will preserve the collateral value of the property that secures the mortgage.
But what if the insurer is unreliable and isn’t able to pay claims following a major storm? Then everything happens at once: properties are damaged at the same time that the insurer becomes insolvent, borrowers default on their loans, and lenders have losses on their books. Multiply those losses, and you get tremendous economic pain to entire financial systems as credit freezes and markets plunge.
The 2008 financial crisis was triggered by the insolvency of nonbanks heavily involved in dodgy mortgages. You probably remember that credit rating agencies were at the heart of the problem: they gave high ratings to mortgage-backed securities that were bought by nonbanks (and investors around the globe). Those MBSs became worthless and the whole house of cards tumbled.
Today, a similar story appears to be playing out in Florida, where 10 percent of the nation’s homeowners live: a dubious credit rating agency is giving high “financial stability” ratings to flimsy insurers. A whole series of players is going along with those ratings, using them to check boxes and issue mortgages. And then those actors are swiftly shifting the resulting mass of risk to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The GSEs are accepting these inflated financial stability rankings and buying these smelly mortgages. The strategy is, must be, to have the feds bail out the situation when storms strike and the casino suddenly closes its doors.
Continue reading “Climate’s Big Short: Florida Insurance and a Financial Apocalypse”



