Robert Pape, Political Scientist, University of Chicago, via email:
The early phase of the Iran war is already displaying several recurring strategic patterns that have appeared repeatedly across modern conflicts. These patterns do not predict every event. But they help explain why wars that begin with expectations of rapid success often expand into much larger and more dangerous confrontations.
Four patterns are already visible.
1. The Escalation Trap
The first pattern is the Escalation Trap, a recurring dynamic in modern war in which early battlefield success produces strategic disappointment, and leaders respond by escalating rather than reconsidering the strategy.
The sequence unfolds in three stages.
Stage 1: Tactical Success, Strategic Failure
The war began with a coordinated U.S.–Israeli strike on Iranian leadership and military targets. The opening campaign destroyed facilities and killed senior officials. In purely military terms, the operation appeared successful.
But the political objective—rapid regime collapse or capitulation—did not occur. The Iranian state remained intact, and the government quickly reasserted control.
This gap between battlefield success and political outcome is the first step of the Escalation Trap.
Stage 2: Escalation
When early success fails to produce the expected political result, leaders often double down. Because the stronger side possesses overwhelming military power, decision-makers assume they hold escalation dominance—the ability to climb the escalation ladder faster and higher than the opponent.
Doubling down becomes an obsession.
· More strikes.
· Broader targets.
· More days of bombing.
Stage 3: Strategic Risk
If escalation still fails, the war becomes far more dangerous. Domestic political pressure makes it difficult for leaders to accept stalemate or failure. The temptation grows to introduce new tools—ground forces, attacks on additional countries, or strikes that dramatically widen the conflict.
Escalation dominance → belief in escalation control → widening strategic risk.
History repeatedly shows the final step in this chain is where wars escape the control of the leaders who launched them.
Early in the crisis, President Trump spoke about multiple “off-ramps” available to end the war. Those options are already fading. Escalation dynamics are shifting the initiative toward actors the United States does not fully control.
• Israel, which has strong incentives to continue leadership targeting
• Russia, which is assisting Iran with intelligence and targeting assistance
• Iran itself, through a strategy of horizontal escalation
The Escalation Trap is becoming more intense.
2. Horizontal Escalation
A second pattern now visible is horizontal escalation, the strategy weaker states often use to counter stronger military coalitions.
When weaker states confront overwhelming military power, they rarely try to defeat it directly on the main battlefield. Instead they widen the war geographically in order to impose costs on the coalition’s weaker members.
Iran has already begun pursuing this strategy.
Over the past several days, Iranian attacks have struck multiple commercial vessels in the Strait of Hormuz while also targeting fuel storage sites and energy infrastructure in Bahrain, Oman, and Saudi Arabia. Tanker traffic through the strait—normally responsible for roughly one-fifth of global oil supply—has fallen sharply as shipping companies avoid the area and insurers withdraw coverage.
Oil markets reacted immediately. Prices surged despite massive releases from strategic petroleum reserves. Energy traders are not pricing only current supply—they are pricing the risk of future disruption.
In other words, the market response itself reflects the strategic logic of horizontal escalation.
By expanding the conflict geographically—attacking shipping lanes, threatening energy infrastructure, and raising risks for neighboring states—the weaker power forces new actors to absorb the costs of the conflict.
Regional attacks → rising domestic costs for allies → pressure on coalition cohesion.
The war is therefore not won by defeating the coalition militarily. It is won by weakening the political glue that holds it together.